View source

'''Speaker''': Roberto di Pietro from Department of Mathematics, Roma Tre University

'''Time and Place''': 10:15 in Room 4523 

'''Title''': Securing Mobile Unattended WSNs against a Mobile Adversary

'''Abstract'''
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) security is complicated
by the lack of inexpensive tamper resistant hardware
in commodity sensors. Indeed, once an adversary compromises
a sensor, all memory and forms of storage become
exposed, along with all secrets. Thereafter, any cryptographic
remedy ceases to be effective. Regaining sensor security after
compromise (i.e., intrusion-resilience) is a formidable challenge.

Prior approaches that rely on either (1) the presence of an on-line
trusted third party (sink), or (2) the availability of a True Random
Number Generator (TRNG) on each sensor, cannot be adopted
in large-scale Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs),
composed of low-cost commodity sensors and characterized by
the intermittent presence of a sink.

In this talk, we explore intrusion resilience in Mobile UWSNs
in the presence of a powerful mobile adversary. We show how
the choice of the sensor mobility model influences intrusion resilience
with respect to this adversary. We also exploreotocols that require only local communication.
Results indicate that sensor density and neighborhood variability are the
two key parameters affecting intrusion resilience. Findings
are supported by extensive analyses and simulations.